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COMMENT ON FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO
TESTIFY
The privilege against self-crimination on the part of accused
in a criminal case is sanctioned by the Constitution of the United
States" and by the constitutions of nearly all of the states.
2
Although it by no means necessarily follows that the privilege
against self-crimination should prohibit the drawing of an infer-
ence against one on trial for a crime who avails himself of his
privilege, federal legislation8 and legislation in all except four
of the states prohibits such an inference.4  In view of this very
'Amend. V: "No person . . .. shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
'The accused is protected against self-crimination in all but two of
the States. For the phrasing of the various constitutional provisions, see
Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. IV, sec. 2252.
In Iowa, the privilege is granted only by statute (1897) Iowa Ann. Code,
sec. 5484: "Defendants in all criminal proceedings shall be cQmpetent
witnesses in their own behalf, but cannot be called as witnesses by the
State"; and the same is true in New Jersey. 2 N. J. Comp. St. (igio)
Evidence, sec. io: "A witness shall not be excused from answering any
questions relevant and material to the issue; provided, the answers will
not expose him to a criminal prosecution or penalty, or to a forfeiture
of his estate."
S(1913) 1 U. S. Comp. St., sec. 1465: "In the trial of all indict-
ments . . . . the person so charged shall at his own request but not
otherwise, be competent as a witness. And his failure to make such
request shall not create any presumption against him."
This statute has been construed as excluding from the jury all comment
upon the failure of accused to testify. Wilson v. United States (1893)
149 U. S. 6o.
'For the phrasing of the various statutory enactments prohibiting an
inference or comment, see Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. I, sec. 488, and Vol.
IV, sec. 2252.
The four states in which legislation does not prevent the inference are
Georgia, New Jersey, Ohio and South Carolina.
In Georgia, the failure of the accused to make a "statement," is not
the ground for an inference or comment. Minor v. State (1904) 120 Ga.
49o; Bird v. State (1874) 5o Ga. 585, 589.
In New Jersey, an inference may be drawn against accused and com-
ment is permitted. State v. Callahan (igog) 77 N. J. L. 685, where the
court sustained the following charge: 'When the accused is upon trial
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general condemnation of the practice of drawing an inference
against one who takes advantage of his privilege, it may be of
interest to those concerned in the administration of the criminal
law to consider how the radical change in Ohio, which permits
comment, is operating in practice, with a view to determining
whether such a change is a wise one.
Among the constitutional amendments submitted to the voters
of Ohio, on September 3rd, 1912, was one which proposed
amending Article I, section io of the Ohio constitution to read
in part as follows: "No person shall be compelled, in any crim-
inal case, to be a witness against himself; but his failure to tes-
tify may be considered by the court and jury and may be made
the subject of comment by counsel." There were 291,717 votes
cast in favor of the adoption of this amendment and 227,547
against such adoption, and it, therefore, became effective as part
of the constitution of Ohio on January Ist, 1913. Prior to the
passage of this amendment, legislation in Ohio had prohibited
any comment upon the fact that accused had failed to testify
in his own behalf.5
A short time ago, the writer submitted to the prosecutors of all
of the counties of Ohio a questionnaire asking those elective
officials, who are charged with the prosecution of those indicted
for crime, to give the benefit of their experience under the recent
amendment. Each prosecutor was asked the following ques-
tions: "i. How many criminal trials were conducted in your
county during the year ending September Ist, 1916? 2. In how
many of these trials did accused take the stand in his own
behalf? 3. Do you believe that the change which permits the
prosecutor to comment on the failure of the accused to testify is a
and the evidence tends to establish facts which, if true, would be con-
clusive of his guilt of the charge against him, and he can disprove them
by his own oath as a witness, if the facts be not true, then his silence
would justify a strong inference that he could not deny the charge."
State v. Twining (i9o6) 73 N. J. L. 683; State v. Banusik (i9o6) 64 AUt.
(N. J.) M; State v. Wines (i9oo) 65 N. J. L. I; Parker v. State (1898)
61 N. J. L. 3o8.
The Ohio General Code of igio, sec. 13661, provides that: "The neglect
or refusal of such person (the accused) to testify shall not create a pre-
sunption against him, nor shall reference be made to, nor comment made
upon such neglect or refusal," but this provision of the Code was
rendered inoperative by a constitutional amendment adopted in 1912.
Ohio Gen. Code of igio, sec. 13661, quoted in note 4, supra.
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wise one? 4. Would you favor a provision requiring accused to
testify against himself even when called by the state?"
Answers were received from fifty-two counties, including all of
the counties which have cities of any considerable size. These
prosecutors reported that they had conducted 1,658 criminal
trials during the year. In 1,507 of these cases, the accused took
the stand and testified in his own defense. Without exception,
each of the fifty-two prosecutors stated that he favored the pro-
vision of the Ohio constitution which permitted an inference and
comment and many were very emphatic in stating their approval.
Fifteen prosecutors were in favor of requiring the accused
to testify against himself as a witness for the state, while thirty-
seven were opposed to such a requirement. The reports from
all these counties showed that in ninety and four-fifths per cent
of all cases which actually came to trial the accused took the
stand in his own behalf. The four most densely populated coun-
ties, in each of which more than one hundred criminal trials
were conducted, reported a total of 744 cases, in 725 or ninety-
seven and two-fifths per cent of which the defendant elected to
testify. In the eleven counties having fifty or more criminal
trials each, there were conducted i,i29 cases, and in i,o82, 'or
ninety-five and four-fifths per cent, the accused took the stand.
The prosecutor of Cuyahoga County, in which is located Cleve-
land and which is therefore the most densely populated in Ohio,
reported that his office had conducted 375 cases during the year;
that all except three defendants took the stand; and that the
three who did not avail themselves of the opportunity of testi-
fying were convicted, and all three of these defendants subse-
quently admitted their guilt.
From the replies submitted it seems evident that, when com-
ment is permitted upon the failure of accused to testify, the
defendant usually takes the stand in his own behalf. Should
he fail to do so, the prosecutor is in a position to urge the jury
to make an inference against the accused in a way which is
extremely detrimental to his chances of securing an acquittal.
While there are no statistics available which indicate just how
large a proportion of defendants took the stand before comment
was permitted, it is reasonably certain that the fact of an infer-
ence being available for the prosecution has a somewhat decided
tendency to cause the accused to take the stand.
Before the practice of drawing an inference can be favored,
however, it must be decided whether it is justifiable to bring this
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pressure to bear upon the accused. The few courts that have
favored the drawing of an inference from a defendant's exercise
of his privilege have sometimes urged that an inference is certain
to be made by the jury and that it is useless to seek to avoid it.6
The replies of the prosecutors above referred to, show their
appreciation of the fact that there is a very practical difference
between the bare inference which a jury may make, and the
inference driven home as an admission of guilt by skillful
counsel. It is sometimes further suggested that the privilege of
accused against self-crimination is not violated, since he is not
forced to make any reply whatever.7 However, since every pros-
ecutor bases his comment upon the hypothesis that any answer
which accused could have made, would have been criminating,
it is evident that accused really had no option and that he is
thus indirectly deprived of his privilege.
To meet fairly the problem of determining the wisdom of
permitting an inference from a claim of privilege by accused, it
seems that one must admit that the policy supporting a privilege
against self-crimination and the policy against permitting an
inference from the claim of such privilege differ only in degree.
However, so many differences in the application of priuciples
which all lawyers recognize, are the results only of differences in
degree that this admission does not answer the question as to
whether an inference should be permitted.
The fact that prosecutors unanimously favor the permission
of comment is not at all surprising, since these men are ordinarily
seeking convictions and naturally have little sympathy with
obstacles in the way of obtaining the necessary evidence. In
'Appleton, C. J., in State v. Cleaves (1871) 59 Me. 298, 30: "The
silence of accused-the omission to explain or contradict, when the evi-
dence tends to establish guilt, is a fact-the probative effect of which
may vary according to the varying conditions of the different trials in
which it may occur-which the jury may perceive, and which perceiving
they can no more disregard than one can the light of the sun, when shining
with full blaze on the open eye."
IAppleton, C. J., in State v. Cleaves (I87I) 59 Me. 398, 3oi: "If inno-
cent, he (the accused) will regard the privilege of testifying as a boon
justly conceded. If guilty, it is optional with the accused to testify or
not, and he cannot complain of the election he may make. If he does
not avail himself of the privilege of contradiction or explanation, it is
his own fault, if by his own misconduct or crime he has placed himself in
such a situation that he prefers any inference which may be drawn from
his refusal to testify, to those which might be drawn from his testimony,
if truly delivered."
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view of this unanimity in the matter of comment, it is interesting
to note that, of these men seeking convictions in criminal cases,
thirty-seven out of fifty-two were opposed to a change which
would remove the privilege against self-crimination and require
accused to testify when called by the state. Various reasons
were given by the prosecutors for their opposition to the entire
abolition of the privilege against self-crimination but those most
commonly given were: "Would lead to perjury," "Would
lead to abuse," "Would not be in keeping with the presump-
tion of innocence," "Would be unfair to the accused,"
"Is unnecessary, since accused is now indirectly forced to take
the stand, .... Because State should make out a case without
requiring accused to testify." Many years ago Bentham8 justly
criticised some of the reasons above given as introducing into
legal procedure the "game" theory, the idea that accused should
be given at least a sporting chance for an escape by an acquittal.
There are many thoughtful persons who believe that accused
should no longer be granted a privilege against self-criminationY
It is pointed out that the privilege does not protect crimes of the
lower order so much as it renders impossible the securing of
evidence necessary to convict those guilty of such crimes as
bribery, rebating, violation of laws against illegal combinations
and similar offenses. Those who support the privilege, there-
fore, should do so upon something better than mere sentimental
grounds.
In an article, a few years ago,10 the writer reached a conclu-
sion favorable to the retention for the present of the privilege
against compulsory self-disclosure in a criminal case. The
guilty deserve no immunity and the conclusion favoring the
privilege was based solely on practical considerations in behalf of
those accused of crime but in fact innocent. A prosecutor who
'See Bentham, Works, Vol. VII, p. 451.
'The Committee on Trial Procedure of the Wisconsin Branch, Ameri-
can Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, in igIo, recommended that
there be stricken from the constitution the provision that no person should
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. A
resolution embodying this recommendation passed the Senate by the
required two-thirds but failed in the Assembly to receive the necessary
two-thirds. See (1912) 2 JoUR. Cnm. LAW AND Cm~INoLOGY, 87o.
See, also, article attacking the privilege by Professor Henry T. Terry,
Constitutional Provisions against Forcing Self-Incrimination (i9o6) i5
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 127.
"° (xgi3) 3 JouR. CRim. LAw AND CRiMoNoGY, 770.
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knows that he cannot interrogate the accused will only subject
one under suspicion to a criminal trial when he has somewhat
satisfactory independent evidence in proof of the guilt of
accused. Where self-crimination is required, the prosecutor is
tempted to rely more and more upon his ability to obtain a con-
viction by reason of defendant's own testimony. The conclusion
of Professor Wigmore,11 "that any system of administration
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory
self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally
thereby," has found considerable justification in experience.
The questioning of the accused in a criminal trial in France cer-
tainly does not seem to lead to a more dignified trial than in a
similar trial in America. Probably the future will see a farther
curtailment of both privileges and disabilities, but, when even
prosecutors themselves favor the retention of a privilege, it
seems probable that it will be many years before it is abolished
in the majority of jurisdictions.
While, as suggested above, the policy against self-crimination
differs only in degree from the policy in prohibition of an infer-
ence, it is submitted that the difference has such practical results
that the decision of those prosecutors who favor the former but
oppose the latter may be justified. Under the practice of per-
mitting an inference in Ohio, the prosecution is forced to obtain
evidence sufficient to make out a case to go to the jury before it
can possibly be in a position to profit by the inference. The
prosecution is not tempted to go to trial without sufficient evi-
dence with a view to the establishment of the case from defend-
ant's own testimony. The innocent defendant is therefore not
prejudiced by reason of the fact that the prosecutor has relied
upon his expected testimony and has therefore made a careless
examination of other sources of proof. Without any testimony
from the accused, the state must introduce sufficient evidence to
cause the grand jury to return an indictment. Without the tes-
timony of accused the state is then required to introduce suffi-
cient admissible evidence so that a jury may find. that all the
essential elements of the crime charged have been proved. The
prosecutor, therefore, is forced to examine others than the
accused, and to make such an examination that the innocent
accused has reasonable protection against being made the object
of a charge in the absence of independent evidence. It seems
' Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3097.
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that the practical consideration which has rendered it unwise
entirely to abolish the privilege against self-crimination, namely,
the danger that the prosecution would be satisfied with an incom-
plete examination of other sources, does not weigh heavily when
the privilege against self-crimination is retained, and comment
is permitted when accused takes advantage of his privilege.
Although the accused practically may be forced to testify after
the state has introduced evidence, which seems to point toward
his guilt, he is not in danger of being placed on trial by an officer
who expects to browbeat him and thus elicit sufficient damaging
testimony to secure a conviction.
As far as the writer has been able to learn, the provision per-
mitting comment upon failure of accused to testify has not led to
abuse in Ohio. The prosecutor's preliminary investigation seems
no less thorough and the trial no less dignified. The innocent
defendant is deprived of no essential protection, and the guilty
accused is deprived only of a shelter to which he is in no way
entitled. In a decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States,' 2 in which only Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, it was held
that the exemption from compulsory self-crimination is not one
of the fundamental rights, immunities and privileges of citizens
of the United States and is not an element of due process of
law, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or the Four-
teenth Amendment thereto. The change in the Ohio constitution
which permits comment, accordingly, is in no way forbidden by
the Federal Constitution.
Whether, therefore, the question of permitting an inference
is considered from practical or theoretical grounds, there seems
to be no valid, reason against the practice now followed in Ohio,
which, while preserving the privilege against self-crimination,
permits court and jury to consider the failure of accused to
testify and also permits counsel to comment on such failure.
WALTER T. DUNMORE.
LAW SCHOOL, WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.
' Twining v. New Jersey (i9o8) 211 U. S. 78.
